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TO

FOURTH MARINE DIVISION
OPERATIONS REPORT

IWO JIMA

1st JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY REPORT

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Serial No.

FIRST JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY OPERATION
REPORT FOR THE IWO JIMA OPERATION**I. GENERAL**

Following the Saipan-Tinian Operation, the First Joint Assault Signal Company returned to the Hawaiian Area, arriving on August 24, 1944, and remained attached to the Fourth Marine Division. Inasmuch as there was a large amount of signal equipment expended on the Saipan-Tinian Operation and most of the remaining equipment turned over to the Fourth Division on Saipan, the training for the first two months was limited to a program of such subjects as physical conditioning, training films, chemical warfare, field sanitation, and familiarization with infantry weapons. All hands received instruction on the live grenade course and rifle range. Upon the arrival of the bulk of the signal equipment in the latter part of October, the teams and parties were formed and a concentrated course of unit training was initiated and maintained until the first of the year when the teams and parties were tactically attached to their respective infantry units and embarked aboard ship for the Iwo Jima Operation.

During this second and last two month training period all Air Liaison and Naval Gunfire Parties and all Shore Party Communication Teams were made available to their respective Regiments and Battalions at any time these units desired their presence. In addition to their regular training under First Joint Assault Signal Company supervision, they participated with their respective units in Regimental and Battalion field exercises, in the four day ship-shore maneuvers that were conducted by each of the three infantry regiments, and in the Division CPX on November 28, 29, and 30.

The training for the Shore Party Communication Teams was considered satisfactory and upon embarkation they were considered fully trained.

It is requested that the First Joint Assault Signal Company receive no more grounded aviators as Air Liaison Officers, and it is recommended that when officer replacements are furnished that they be made available at least three months prior to embarkation for combat. The state of training of the enlisted men of the Air Liaison Parties and their functioning together as teams was very satisfactory, but the qualifications of seven (7) of the fourteen (14) officers left much to be desired. Immediately following the Saipan-Tinian Operation, seven (7) of the original Air Liaison Officers, all Captains (AVS), were detached and four (4) replacements, all Second Lieutenants (AV) were furnished. These new officers were graduates of OCS and ROC, but their Air Liaison training was limited to two weeks of schooling at North Island. With

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FIRST JASCO OPERATIONS REPORT FOR THE IWO JIMA OPERATION (Cont'd.)

this background and under the instruction of the seven (7) remaining Air Liaison Officers those officers learned quickly and were fully trained and qualified for combat. On November 27, 1944, four weeks before embarkation, five (5) of the seven (7) remaining experienced Air Liaison Officers were detached. Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific was requested to reconsider these detachments and to leave three (3) of the five (5) to serve as Regimental Air Liaison Officers, but this request was disapproved. Seven (7) grounded aviators were then assigned to the First Joint Assault Signal Company as Air Liaison Officers. These officers also had the two weeks training at North Island, but they had not attended OCS or ROC, their qualifications being limited to duty as Naval Aviators. These officers were given as much instruction as was possible with the facilities and personnel available, but four weeks of training as Air Liaison Officers for grounded aviators with no infantry experience is not considered sufficient. The field commissioning of seven (7) of the Air Liaison non-commissioned officers who had been through two (2) operations would have been a better solution.

Another factor that hindered the training of these officers was that the senior Air Liaison Officer was rarely available to aid in their instruction. Since the First Joint Assault Signal Company has been attached to the Fourth Marine Division, the senior Air Liaison Officer has been a member of the D-3 Section, serving as an Assistant Air Officer and Air Observer and his only connection with the First Joint Assault Signal Company has been to be carried on its rolls. The principal duty of this Officer should be responsibility for the training of the Air Liaison Parties. It is recommended that this Officer be relieved of his various duties in the D-3 Section and rejoin the First Joint Assault Signal Company where he can be used to aid in the training of the Air Liaison Parties.

It is recommended that in the future every attempt be made to furnish the replacements for the Naval Gunfire Parties, both officers and men, as soon as possible after returning to the rest base, and that if specialized training is to be given the Naval Gunfire personnel in Pearl Harbor or elsewhere, that the entire section of both officers and enlisted men be given the training together as a unit. Fleet Marine Force Special Order #86-44 was a great help in obtaining the additional personnel over the T/O allowance that the parties needed, but these additional men arrived so late that there was little opportunity to train them sufficiently. The five (5) Spotting Officers that were needed as replacements also were late in arriving, reporting in the latter part of November. In addition, during the period from September 6, 1944, to November 12, 1944, all Naval Gunfire Liaison Officers were on temporary detached duty as observers on the Leyte Operation and from October 20, 1944, to November 13, 1944, all Spotting Officers and Scout Sergeants were in Pearl Harbor attending a Navy Gunnery School. This was the period that the Division Training Order specified that team and unit training

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FIRST JASCO OPERATIONS REPORT FOR THE IWO JIMA OPERATION (Cont'd.)

should be emphasized, but with all officers and Scout Sergeants absent there was certainly no opportunity to conduct team training as it should have been done to effectively prepare the Naval Gunfire Parties for combat.

If radar personnel are to be reclassified as radio operators it is recommended that they be sent to a radio school before assigning them to a combat organization, even if they have to be sent back to the States to receive the training. Fleet Marine Force Special Order #36-44 called for an additional thirty (30) radio operators for the Naval Gunfire Section of each Joint Assault Signal Company. In lieu thereto, the First Joint Assault Signal Company received twenty-five (25) radar operators, including twelve (12) corporals, three weeks before embarkation. These men knew absolutely nothing about radio communications, not even voice procedure, and were useless except as equipment carriers.

Inasmuch as all basic duty men in the First Joint Assault Signal Company are assigned to Air Liaison or Naval Gunfire Parties as equipment carriers during an operation, a three-weeks course in communications covering both radio and wire was given to these men. At the conclusion of the course seven (7) of these were designated communication personnel, voice radio operators (767).

It is recommended that communication officers not be used for unrelated duties such as Air Liaison Officers. Prior to embarkation for the Iwo Jima Operation, one of the Shore Party Communications Officers was assigned as an Assistant Air Liaison Officer in the Division Air Liaison Party, was later made a Regimental Air Liaison Officer, and finally wound up as a Battalion Air Liaison Officer during the latter stages of the operation.

On past operations, considerable "attached unit" difficulty was encountered by the various teams and parties of the First Joint Assault Signal Company, mostly in dealing with the Battalion and Regimental Quartermasters. On this Operation, however, there were only one or two instances where the units refused to issue clothing or equipment to the attached First Joint Assault Signal Company teams and parties. When an organization such as the First Joint Assault Signal Company has detachments with every Infantry RCT and BLT Headquarters, it is practically an impossibility for the First Joint Assault Signal Company Quartermaster to make the rounds of each Command Post to keep them supplied; the unit Quartermasters should take care of their attached units.

Following the Saipan-Tinian Operation, a signal requisition for the deficiencies of the First Joint Assault Signal Company was forwarded to Supply Service, FMF, Pac. This requisition was forwarded on September 16, 1944, and a considerable amount of equipment arrived in the latter part of October; but it was not until the middle of December that the entire requisition was filled.

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FIRST JASCO OPERATIONS REPORT FOR THE IWO JIMA OPERATION (Cont'd.)

Several days before embarkation, thirty-two (32) TBX-8's were furnished the First Joint Assault Signal Company by Supply Service, FMF, Pac, to replace the TBX-4's and SCR 284's in the Air Liaison and Naval Gunfire Sections. The Division Signal Officer ordered five (5) of these turned over to the Division Signal Quartermaster and the other twenty-seven (27) distributed to the Battalion Air Liaison and Naval Gunfire Parties. Considerable difficulty was encountered with these particular radios, burnt out generators resulting from the presence of moisture and fungus growth being the main trouble. This failure did not appear until after several hours of use, and as there was little opportunity to use them prior to embarkation, it was not until the rehearsal exercise that the trouble developed. The generators were repaired at the 6th Base Depot Signal Repair Shop at Pearl Harbor, as was a considerable amount of other equipment.

It is recommended that all sections of the First Joint Assault Signal Company be furnished with one common portable radio set, the SCR 694 being considered the most likely. The Company now has TBX-2's, TBX-4's, TBX-5's, TBX-8's, and SCR 284's, and one set for all three sections would certainly lessen the supply and repair problems.

Upon embarkation for the Iwo Jima Operation, the Signal Supply and Repair Section of the First Joint Assault Signal Company was combined with that of the Fourth Division.

The First Joint Assault Signal Company suffered a total of ten (10) officer and one hundred two (102) enlisted casualties on the Iwo Jima Operation, of which two (2) officers and twenty-eight (28) enlisted were killed in action or died of wounds.

II. AIR LIAISON

The following comments on the Air Liaison Section deal with administrative matters only; the tactical employment of the Air Liaison Parties and their functioning on the operation are covered in the Division Operation Report.

The T/O for JASCo calls for each Air Liaison Party to be composed of one (1) officer and three (3) enlisted radio operators (AVN). As was done on the Roi-Namur and Saipan-Tinian Operations, each Battalion and Regimental Party was increased, this time by three (3) enlisted men, by utilizing the basic duty men, cooks, and quartermaster personnel in Company Headquarters. The Division Air Liaison Party was increased so that it totaled one (1) officer and ten (10) enlisted. The Air Liaison Section was deficient four (4) radio operators, (AVN), so four (4) radio operators (CP), were assigned from the Shore Party Section so that each party would have three (3) radio operators.

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OPERATIONS REPORT FOR THE IWO JIMA OPERATION (Cont'd.)

The Air Liaison Section of the First Joint Assault Signal Company suffered a total of six (6) officer and seventeen (17) enlisted casualties, of which two (2) officers and five (5) enlisted were killed in action or died of wounds.

There is no need of the AN/VRC-1 radio jeeps in the Air Liaison Section of the First Joint Assault Signal Company; MZ (TCS) radio jeeps will do just as well. Before each operation there is a considerable amount of time and equipment expended on putting the SCR 542's in the AN/VRC-1's on frequency, and inasmuch as this radio has never once been used by an Air Liaison Party on any of the three operations, its continued use is considered a waste of equipment.

Neither is the employment of a half-track mounted SCR 299 by the Division Air Liaison Party considered a necessity or even desirable. An SCR 299 mounted in a panel truck such as the Division Signal Company uses would be more practicable. The continued mechanical failures of the half-track make it more of a liability than an asset.

The continued employment of the RBZ radio by the Air Liaison Parties is not recommended. It is all the Party can do as it is to take care of a portable radio and a radio jeep and operate on the SAR Net without burdening it down with another radio and another net. It should be the function of the communications platoon or "2" Section to monitor the SAO Net - not the Air Liaison Party.

The loss of major items of signal equipment by the Air Liaison Parties on the Iwo Jima Operation is estimated to be approximately 30%. These losses were replenished by the Fourth Division Signal Quartermaster. Five (5) AN/VRC-1's were destroyed on the beach before they could be used because they were landed too soon. It is recommended that in the future the radio jeeps be boated so that they can be called in upon request and when the units have use for them, rather than having them land at a specified time.

The entire Air Liaison Party of the Third Battalion, Twenty-Fifth Marines was a casualty on D-Day. Another Party was formed by using three radio operators from one of the Shore Party Communication Teams, an NCO from the RCT 24 Air Liaison Party, and the previously mentioned Communications Officer who was acting as the RCT 25 Air Liaison Officer at the time.

III. NAVAL GUNFIRE

The following comments on the Naval Gunfire Section deal with administrative matters only; the tactical employment of Naval Gunfire

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Parties and their functioning on this Operation are covered in the Division Operation Report.

Fleet Marine Force Special Order #86-44 increased each Spotting Section from one (1) officer and three (3) enlisted to one (1) officer and six (6) enlisted; and each Naval Liaison Section from one (1) officer and two (2) enlisted to one (1) officer and five (5) enlisted. This was considered sufficient, but by utilizing the Company Headquarters personnel, each Naval Liaison Section was increased by one (1) enlisted, making a total of six (6). Due to the heavy casualties suffered by the Naval Gunfire Section in the Saipan-Tinian Operation, and because of the lack of qualified replacements, such as the previously mentioned radar men, it was necessary to transfer eleven (11) non-commissioned officers, all radio operators, from the Shore Party Section to the Naval Gunfire Section.

The Naval Gunfire Section of the First Joint Assault Signal Company suffered a total of two (?) officer and thirty-five (35) enlisted casualties on the Iwo Jima Operation, of which nine (9) enlisted were killed in action or died of wounds.

In October, the First Joint Assault Signal Company received twelve (12) MZ radio jeeps for the Naval Gunfire Section to be used on the Iwo Jima Operation as a test, the results of which were to form a basis for future recommendations for inclusion of these MZ's in the T/BA. Due to the type of operation however and the fact that seven (7) of the twelve (12) jeeps were destroyed on the beach before they were ever used, the Iwo Jima Operation did not bring forth all the advantages of the MZ. On this operation, the principal use of the MZ was as a relay station between the Spotter ashore and the firing ship. SCR 300's were issued to both the Spotter and Naval Liaison Officer and the Naval Liaison Officer remained boated with the MZ to relay the information that he received from the Spotter on the SCR 300. The five (5) MZ's that did get past the beach safely were used continually and gave excellent results. It is recommended that Joint Assault Signal Company T/BA be altered so that thirteen (13) MZ radio jeeps are substituted for the thirteen (13) cargo jeeps that the Naval Gunfire Liaison Parties now rate.

The SCR 536's of the Naval Gunfire Parties of the Assault BLT's were set on their initial spotting frequencies and excellent results obtained. In several cases this was the only contact Parties ashore had with their firing ships.

During the rehearsal period, four (4) radar beacon teams of two (2) men each were assigned to the First Joint Assault Signal Company, but due to the nature of the terrain and the tactical situation, the radar beacons were never used on the operation.

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TELETYPE OPERATIONS REPORT FOR THE IWO JIMA OPERATION (Cont'd.)

The loss of major items of signal equipment by the Naval Gunfire Parties on the Iwo Jima Operation is estimated to be 35%. These losses were replenished by the Division Signal Quartermaster.

IV. SHORE PARTY COMMUNICATIONS

Inasmuch as the Commanding Officer, First Joint Assault Signal Company, was the Division Shore Party Communications Officer on the Iwo Jima Operation, a discussion of the tactical employment as well as the administrative details of the Shore Party Communication Section is contained herein. The assignment of the Commanding Officer of the Joint Assault Signal Company as the Division Shore Party Communication Officer in addition to his regular duties is considered an excellent idea and worked out well on this operation.

On the Rei-Namur and Saipan-Tinian Operations, the nine (9) Joint Assault Signal Company Shore Party Communication Teams were attached one per each battalion, regardless of whether the battalion was in assault or reserve. On the Iwo Jima Operation however, Shore Party Communications paralleled the Division Communications inasmuch as there was one team attached to the Division Shore Party Headquarters, one to each of the two Assault RCT Shore Party Headquarters, and one to each BLT Shore Party of the Assault Regiments. There were no Shore Party Communication Teams attached to the reserve regiment. This arrangement proved to be far more efficient than that employed on the two previous operations and resulted in excellent communications on the beach.

On Yellow Beaches, the Shore Party Communication Teams of Battalion Landing Teams 1/23 and 2/23 landed at approximately H $\frac{1}{2}$ on Yellow 1 and Yellow 2 respectively, and established radio communications. This included a TBY on the Shore Party Lateral Net and an SCR 300 on the Battalion Command Net of the Battalion Landing Team to which they were attached. Intra-beach wire communications were established between Yellow 2 and Blue 1 by H $\frac{1}{6}$, between Yellow 2 and Yellow 1, and between Yellow 1 and the Fifth Division on Red 2 by H $\frac{1}{7}$. The Shore Party Communication Team of BLT 3/23 (in reserve) landed on Yellow 1 at approximately H $\frac{1}{3}$ and consolidated with the BLT 1/23 Shore Party Communication Team. The RCT 23 Shore Party Communication Team landed on Yellow 2 at approximately H $\frac{1}{8\frac{1}{2}}$, but set up at a different location than the BLT 2/23 Team. On D $\frac{1}{4}$, the Shore Party of the Twenty First Marines was assigned to Yellow 2 and operated under the control of the RCT 23 Shore Party Commander. The three (3) BLT Shore Party Communication Teams of the Twenty First Marines were combined to form one Regimental Team and assigned to Yellow 2. At the same time the BLT 2/23 Shore Party Communication Team was removed and combined with the RCT 23 Team. On D $\frac{1}{6}$, when the Twenty First Marines Shore Party was transferred to Black Beach, the BLT 1/23 Shore Party Communication Team was removed from Yellow 1 and

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consolidated with the RCT 23 Team; thus a regimental beach was established insofar as communications were concerned.

On Blue Beaches, the Shore Party Communication Teams of Battalion Landing Teams 1/25 and 3/25 landed at approximately H¹/5 on Blue 1. The Shore Party Communication Team of BLT 1/25 moved to the right flank of Blue 1 and set up communications. Due to the tactical situation that developed, the BLT 3/25 Shore Party Communication Team was never moved to Blue 2 as previously planned, but remained on the left flank of Blue 1. The Shore Party Communication Team of BLT 2/25 (in reserve) landed on the left flank of Blue 1 at approximately H¹/8 and consolidated with the BLT 3/25 Team. The RCT 25 Shore Party Communication Team landed at H¹/8½ and set up in the middle of Blue 1. Intra-beach wire communications between the Blue Beaches and between Blue 1 and Yellow 2 were established at approximately H¹/6. Due to the amount of fire on the beach, Blue Beaches were slow in developing and the RCT 25 and BLT 1/25 Shore Party Communication Teams satisfactorily handled all communications on these beaches until D¹/6 when the two teams consolidated, thus forming a regimental beach.

The Division Shore Party Communication Team landed on Blue 1 on D¹/1 and consolidated with the two teams of Battalion Landing Team 2/25 and Battalion Landing Team 3/25.

Thus, on D¹/6, the Fourth Marine Division Shore Party Communications consisted of three switching centrals furnishing communications for the Regimental Shore Parties on Yellow and Blue Beaches respectively and for the Division Shore Party Headquarters. This organization continued until D¹/18 when the Garrison Forces took over the beaches and the Fourth Division Shore Party was relieved.

The consolidation of the Shore Party Communications was never carried beyond the Regimental phase because the only switchboards available were BD-71's. With a BD-96 switchboard the two regimental boards could have been eliminated. It is recommended that one (1) BD-96 be added to the T/BA of each Joint Assault Signal Company for the use of the Shore Party Section.

All wire lines laid on the Fourth Division Beaches were overheaded by utilizing lance poles and "two-by-fours". Inasmuch as over 50% of the 90 lance poles carried ashore by the Shore Party Section of the First Joint Assault Signal Company were destroyed or lost, the "two-by-fours" sent ashore by the Corps Signal Section were invaluable in placing the wire overhead. There were very few wire lines damaged by our vehicles, partly because all lines were placed overhead as soon as laid, and partly because the artrac and bulldozer drivers were conscious of the importance of the wire and went to great efforts to protect it. There was considerable damage done to the wire by shrapnel, but

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inasmuch as the lines were properly tagged, there was very little difficulty in repairing the breaks. Because of the loose sand and the nature of the beach no attempt was made to place any of the wire underground. A "Weasel" for wire laying purposes on the beach would be invaluable and its inclusion in the Joint Assault Signal Company T/BA is recommended.

During the ship-shore phase of the operation, the Division Shore Party Commander on the Division Control Vessel had no direct communication with the Shore Party elements ashore. The Navy Beachmaster radio circuits were too crowded and unreliable. It is recommended that in the future, space be allotted on the Division Control Vessel for a portable radio to be set up on the Shore Party Lateral Net. It is further recommended that space also be allotted on the Regimental Control Vessels for portable radios to be set up on the Shore Party Lateral Net for the use of the RCT Shore Party Commanders while they are afloat.

The Shore Party Lateral Net functioned well but once the wire lines were in, there was practically no traffic sent on this circuit. It was kept operating mainly as an emergency measure in the event of the wire lines being knocked out. It is recommended that the Division Shore Party be the net Control station on this Net rather than Division Headquarters.

As was done in the Saipan-Tinian Operation, the Shore Parties were furnished with SCR 300's which were placed on the respective BLT and RCT SCR 300 Command Nets; thus serving as a means of Shore Party-Inland Communications. Once again this circuit was of great value and is considered the most important of the Shore Party Nets. The T/BA for the First Joint Assault Signal Company however still calls for a TBX to be used on this circuit and it is recommended that the T/BA for the First Joint Assault Signal Company be decreased by ten (10) TBX's and increased by ten (10) SCR 300's.

Prior to D-2 there were no provisions made for the Division Shore Party ashore to come up on the Division Logistical Control Net. At this time permission was obtained to enter the net and there was a considerable amount of traffic passed between the Division Shore Party Commander and the Division representative aboard the Division Control Vessel. It is recommended that provisions be made in the basic communication plan for the Division Shore Party ashore to operate on the Division Logistical Control Net.

The Local Shore Party SCR 536 Net on 5500 kilocycles was useless inasmuch every Shore Party Communication Team in all three Divisions had three (3) sets on this frequency and each beachmaster had five (5) sets on the same frequency.

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The Ship-Shore Administrative Net was not satisfactory inasmuch as there never seemed to be any action taken on any of the messages sent from the beach to the ship. There was close cooperation between the Beachmaster and the Shore Party Communication Officer and there was no difficulty in sending the message or getting an operators receipt from the ship, but the message never seemed to reach the TQM or whomever it was intended for aboard the ship. It is considered that more thorough instruction for Navy radio operators and CWO's in the call signs of units of the landing force would help to correct this situation.

The T/BA for the First Joint Assault Signal Company calls for ten (10) Public Address Systems, one (1) for each Shore Party Communication Team. It is an impossibility for each team to carry ashore one of these heavy, clumsy systems in addition to the large amount of equipment they already have, so as was done in the Saipan-Tinian Operation, four (4) sets, one per each beach, were turned over to the Shore Party. It is recommended that all ten (10) Public Address systems be removed from the T/BA of the First Joint Assault Signal Company and placed in that of the Pioneer Battalion.

The Shore Party Section of the First Joint Assault Signal Company had two (2) officer and thirty-three (33) enlisted casualties, of which eleven (11) enlisted were killed in action. The loss of major items of signal equipment is estimated to be 25%. These losses in men and equipment were replaced initially by utilizing personnel and equipment from the two Shore Party Communication Teams in reserve. Later, as the regimental beaches were formed, all Battalion Landing Team Shore Party personnel and equipment became available to the Division and RCT Teams. During the course of the operation, a total of one (1) officer and seventy-five (75) enlisted men were transferred to the Fourth Division as communication replacements. With the exception of eight (8) enlisted casualties that occurred while the men were attached to the Division, all of these replacements were returned to the First Joint Assault Signal Company prior to reembarkation on D/28.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. In accordance with the preceding paragraphs and the information as contained therein, the following recommendations are made with the belief that if approved they will more effectively prepare the various elements of the First Joint Assault Signal Company for combat, and during combat will enable these elements to more effectively perform their duties.

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FIRST JASCO OPERATIONS REPORT FOR THE IWO JIMA OPERATION (Cont'd.)

(a) General.

- (1) That equipment and personnel deficiencies be replenished as soon as possible after return to the rest base.
- (2) That the First Joint Assault Signal Company receive no more radar operators in lieu of radio operators.
- (3) That communication officers not be used for unrelated duties such as Air Liaison Officers.
- (4) That specialized training at distant points such as Pearl Harbor for units such as Naval Gunfire Parties be conducted for the entire units or parties rather than for just the officers or designated enlisted men alone.
- (5) That any changes or substitutions in major items of signal equipment be made at least one (1) month before embarkation.
- (6) That all three sections of the First Joint Assault Signal Company be furnished with one (1) common portable radio set and that this set be an SCR 694.


(b) Air Liaison and Naval Gunfire.

- (1) That the First Joint Assault Signal Company receive no more grounded aviators as Air Liaison Officers.
- (2) That the senior Air Liaison Officer be relieved of his various duties in the D-3 Section and rejoin the First Joint Assault Signal Company where he can be used in the training of the Air Liaison Parties.
- (3) That the Air Liaison Parties not be required to monitor the SAO Net and that they not be issued RBZ's for this use.
- (4) That the radio jeeps of the Air Liaison and Naval Gunfire Parties be boated so that they can be called ashore when they are needed and when it is safe for them to land.
- (5) That MZ radio jeeps replace the AN/VRC-1 radio jeeps in the Air Liaison Parties.
- (6) That an SCR 299 mounted in a panel truck replace the Half-track mounted SCR 299 in the Division Air Liaison Party.
- (7) That thirteen (13) MZ radio jeeps be added to the First Joint Assault Signal Company T/BA for the use of the Naval Gunfire Liaison Sections and in accordance with this, the T/BA be decreased by thirteen (13) cargo jeeps.

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(c) Shore Party.

- (1) That the assignment of either the Commanding Officer or Executive Officer of the First Joint Assault Signal Company as Division Shore Party Communications Officer be continued on future operations.
- (2) That in the future the assignment of Shore Party Communication Teams be made to parallel the Division Communications system as was done in this operation.
- (3) That it be SOP for wire on the beach to be placed overhead rather than underground.
- (4) That space be allotted on the Division and Regimental Control vessels for a portable radio to be placed on the Shore Party Lateral Net.
- (5) That the Division Shore Party be the Net Control Station on the Shore Party Lateral Net.
- (6) That provisions be made in the basic communication plan for the Division Shore Party to operate on the Division Logistical Control Net.
- (7) That one (1) BD-96 switchboard be added to the T/BA of the First Joint Assault Signal Company for the use of the Shore Party Section.
- (8) That a "Weasel" be added to the T/BA of the First Joint Assault Signal Company for wire laying purposes on the beach.
- (9) That the T/BA of the First Joint Assault Signal Company be decreased by ten (10) TBX's and increased by ten (10) SCR 300's for the Shore Party - Inland Net.
- (10) That the ten (10) Public Address systems of the First Joint Assault Signal Company be removed from the First Joint Assault Signal Company T/BA and included in that of the Pioneer Battalion.

2. It is further recommended that in the event the First Joint Assault Signal Company becomes an organic part of the Fourth Marine Division, the Company retain its present organization and remain a separate unit operating directly under Division Headquarters.

M. L. Thompson

M. L. THOMPSON,
Captain, U. S. Marine Corps,
Commanding, First Joint Assault Signal Company.